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In the other jurisdictions, recovery is allowed in the event of a contempo-
raneous physical injury only when that physical injury is of a definite and
substantial character, and the direct cause of the fright or shock.10
The latter view, seems to be the most practical solution to these cases.
To allow recovery when there is the slightest contact, independent of its
effect or proximate relevancy, is to open the door to many fictitious suits
which are hard to disprove. To follow any other view, would be to permit
plaintiffs with exceptionally weak nervous systems easily to recover enor-
mous verdict. Public policy, therefore, demands that there be no recov-
ery for the physical consequences of fright, in the absence of some substan-
tial, contributing physical injury caused by the defendant's negligent con-
duct.11 The instant case, therefore, which is in accord with prior Missouri
decisions, 12 follows what seems to be the more practical ruling.
M. I. G.
ToRTs-DUTY OF CAE--PosTLAN AS INVITE--[Missouri].-Plaintiff, a
United States postman, brought an action for injuries sustained while de-
livering mail on a slippery runway leading from the sidewalk to defendant's
place of business.1 The court, though reversing a judgment in favor of
plaintiff because of his contributory negligence, and applying the principle
volenti non fit injuria, nevertheless held, that a United States postman en-
gaged in the performance of his duties enters the premises of those he
serves upon the express or implied invitation to do so because of the mutual
benefit to the postman and the landowner.2 Although this was the first dle-
cision by a Missouri appellate court on this point, the cases outside this
jurisdiction, on which the court relied, took this view.3
It is generally agreed among text-writers,4 and supported by the decided
10. Hack v. Dady, 127 N. Y. Supp. (1911); Decatur v. Hamilton, 89 Ill.
App. 561; see, Haile v. Texas & P. R. R. Co., 60 Fed. 557, (C. C. A. 5, 1849),
in which the falling of the plaintiff to the floor of the car was held not to
constitute a physical injury; Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R. Co., 168 Mass.
285; 47 N. E. 88 (1897), in which the contact was held to be a trivial
matter.
11. Supra, note 5; supra, note 6, 1. c. 1121; Mitchell v. Rochester R. R.
Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354, 34 L. R. A. 781 (1896) ; Braun v. Craven,
175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 657, 42 L. R. A. 199 (1898).
12. Triggs v. St. Louis, K. C. & N. R. R. Co., 74 Mo. 147, 41 Am. Rep.
305 (1881); Porter v. St. Joseph R. R. Co., 311 Mo. 66, 277 S. W. 913
(1925) ; Chawkley v. Wabash R. R. Co., 317 Mo. 782, 297 S. W. 20 (1927).
1. Paubel v. Hitz, 96 S. W. (2d) 369 (Mo. 1936).
2. Ibid., at p. 370.
3. Gordon v. Cummings et a., 152 Mass. 513, 25 N. E. 978, 9 L. R. A.
640, 23 Ann. St. Rep. 846 (1890) ; Sutton v. Penn, 238 Ill. App. 182 (1925).
4. 3 Cooley, Torts (Haggard's 4th ed. 1932) sec. 440; Salmond, Torts
(7th ed. 1928) sec. 122, especially noting discussion on the conflict in the
cases as to whether the owner or occupant owes the invitee the duty of rea-
sonable care or the duty to warn him of the danger.
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cases,
5 that when an owner or occupant of premises invites another either
expresslyc or by implication,7 to come on his premises, he must exercise
reasonable care to keep those premises in repair, and may be held liable
in a suit by the other for damages sustained by reason of any dangerous
condition on the premises, provided the injured party was in the exercise
of due care.8 On the other hand, where there is no invitation, but the party
has a legal right to be on the premises, he must take them as he finds them
and the owner or occupant is liable only for his wanton or wilful miscon-
duct" or for maintenance of latent defects or "traps" known to the owner
or occupant, but not known to the licensee.'0 While these statements serve
as general guides, the difficulty for the court has been to decide under the
particular facts the status of the injured party and the amount of care
owing to him." This issue has arisen with respect to government officials,12
most of the cases, however, being restricted to firemen 13 and policemen.' 4
In the absence of a statute15 or a municipal ordinance 6 imposing addi-
tional duties with respect to the condition of the premises on the owner or
occupant, it is generally held that a policeman in the exercise of his duties
is a mere licensee.17 The same rule is applied in the majority of jurisdic-
tions in regard to firemen,' 8 the reason commonly given being that the right
to enter the premises exists independently of any invitation because it is
in the interest of the public good to prevent a general conflagration.' 9 The
New York Court of Appeals, however, in the case of Meirs v. Fred Koch
Brewery,20 recognized that under some circumstances a duty of reasonable
5. Roman v. King, 289 Mo. 641, 233 S. W. 161, 25 A. L. R. 1263 (1921) ;
Sweeny v. Old Colony & N. R. R. Co., 10 Allen (Mass.) 368, 87 Am. Dec.
644 (1865).
6. Noyes v. Des Moines Club, 178 Ia. 815, 160 N. W. 215 (1916).
7. O'Rourke v. Marshall Field & Co., 307 Ill. 197, 138 N. E. 625, 22
N. C. C. A. 766, 27 A. L. R. 1014 (1923).
8. It has been held to be contributory negligence to fall over a step out-
side a toilet, which plaintiff had seen a minute and a half before, when
she went in. Main v. Lehman, 294 Mo. 579, 243 S. W. 91 (1922).
9. For a discussion of what is meant by the terms "wanton" and "wilful"
see Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Lacy, 78 Kan. 622, 97 Pac. 1025 (1908).
10. "A trap is a figure of speech not a formula. It involves the idea of
concealment and surprise, of an appearance of safety under circumstances
cloaking a reality of danger." Latham v. Johnson, 1 K. B. 398, 415 (1913).
11. 3 Cooley, op. cit., sec. 440, p. 193.
12. See 45 C. J. 817, sec. 226, n. 2.
13. Litch v. White, 160 Cal. 497, 117 Pac. 515 (1911).
14. Creeden v. Boston & M. R. Co., 193 Mass. 280, 79 N. E. 344, 9 Ann.
Cas. 1121 (1906). See also 13 A. L. R. 637, where the duty owing to fire-
men and policemen is fully discussed.
15. Racine v. Morris, 201 N. Y. 240, 94 N. E. 864 (1911).
16. Thrift v. Vandalia R. Co., 145 11. App. 414 (1908).
17. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co. v. Fryar, 132 Tenn. 612, L. R. A.
1916B, 791, 179 S. W. 127, 11 N. C. C. A. 706 (1915).
18. New Omaha Thomson-Houston Electric Light Co. v. Anderson, 73
Neb. 84, 102 N. W. 89 (1905).
19. Lunt v. Post Printing, etc., Co., 48 Colo. 316, 324, 110 P. 203, 30
L. R. A. (N. S.) 60, 21 Ann. Cas. 492 (1910).
20. 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491, 13 A. L. R. 633 (1920).
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care in maintaining the premises for a fireman should be imposed upon an
owner of lands.21
In a related case22 the St. Louis Court of Appeals under the particular
facts classed a government inspector of livestock as a licensee. But there
was dictum to the effect that had plaintiff been injured in the performance
of his official duties which required his presence on defendant's pri-sate
property, he would have been held an invitee.23 In saying this, the court
indicated that the test for determining plaintiff's status was the owner's
reasonable anticipation of his presence on the premises at the precise time
and place of the injury.24 A test of "reasonable anticipation," however,
while important in determining the duty of care owing plaintiff, is not the
true test of his status. 25 Once having determined that he is not a mere tres-
passer or licensee, the court can then decide the duty owing him. This
would depend on whether the owner could reasonably anticipate his pres-
ence, and if, as in the Koch case, there were previous acts apprising the
owner of plaintiff's probable presence on the particular part of the prem-
ises, the court would then be justified in setting up a duty of reasonable
care.
26
Decisions on related questions in states contiguous to Missouri have not
been plentiful. An Illinois appellate court has held a United States post-
man to be an invitee27 in spite of the fact that in that state firemen 28 and
policemen 29 are considered licensees. In that case, the postman slipped on
an oily floor while delivering mail to offices on the second floor of defendant's
building. The court said, in rendering its decision, that the owner of the
premises, in leasing offices on the second floor, must have known that her
tenants would have their mail delivered and that such would be a daily
occurrence.30 In Illinois a city building inspector has been held a mere
licensee,2 ' though a city water inspector was treated as an invitee,3 2 the
court in the latter case, however, resting its decision on the broad ground
of liability laid down in Heaven v. Pender.3 Neither the Kansas nor Arkan-
21. Andrews, J., in rendering the decision said: "We are unwilling to
place our decision on so narrow a ground (implied invitation) .... The es-
sential element is that he entered the premises, rightfully, on the way
adapted by the owner for that purpose and that he was neither a tres-
passer nor a licensee."
22. Boneau v. Swift & Co., 66 S. W. (2d) 172.
23. Ibid., at p. 175.
24. Ibid.
25. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts (1926) 179.
26. Ibid., at p. 156 et seq.
27. Sutton v. Penn, 238 Ill. App. 182 (1925).
28. Volluz v. East St. Louis Light & Power Co., 210 Ill. App. 565 (1918).
29. Thrift v. Vandalia R. Co., 145 Ill. App. 414 (1908).
30. Sutton v. Penn, supra, note 27 at p. 185.
31. Ross v. Becklenberg, 209 Ill. App. 144 (1917).
32. Kennedy v. Heisen, 182 Ill. App. 200 (1913).
33. 11 Q. B. D. 506 (1883) "Wherever one person is, by circumstances,
placed in such a position with regard to another that every one of ordinary
sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary
care and skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances, he
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sas courts seem to have passed on the status of such government officials.
The problem as to policemen arose in Oklahoma in St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co. ti. WilliamnsU and in Kithcart v. Feldman.35 In the former case a
night policeman, whose custom was to inspect the night freight trains of
defendant railroad company on their arrival, was held an invitee,36 but
there had been a special request made to the mayor and chief of police by
the chief special officer of defendant railroad company that he continue this
custom. In the latter case, however, the court held that a policeman enter-
ing defendant's premises for the purpose of making an arrest was a mere
licensee.37
S. J. B.
TORTS-FIRST INJURY AS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT INJURY-
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-[District of Columbia].-The plaintiff, in the
case of S. S. Kresge v. Kenney,1 sustained a fractured pubis bone from a
fall occasioned by the negligence of the defendant company. Ten months
later, while able to move around the house only with the assistance of her
family, and according to the testimony of her physician, in a very weak
state, the plaintiff got out of her bed alone to get a drink of water. In so
doing she fell again and fractured the bone in the same place. The court
declared, as a matter of law, that the original negligence was not the cause
of the injuries sustained by the second fall, which was chiefly caused by
her own contributory negligence.
In an effort to prove her contentions the plaintiff cited various cases in
which an injured person was allowed to recover for the effects of a second
injury which had taken place during the period of recovery from the first.2
Answering these authorities the court pointed out that "each case must rest
largely upon its own facts, since there are usually such variations in the
facts of others as to make them not persuasive. ' 3 The fact which differ-
entiated the case under discussion from those cited was the imprudence of
the plaintiff in attempting to do something which she should have known
was outside her physical powers.
In the case of Hartnett v. Tripp4 the plaintiff was injured the second
time when the crutch he was using slipped from beneath him. The use of
would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty
arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger."
34. 56 P. (2d) 815 (Okla. 1936).
35. 215 Pac. 419 (Okla. 1923).
36. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Williams, supra, note 34 at p. 816.
37. Kithcart v. Feldman, supra, note 35 at p. 420.
1. 4 U. S. Law Week 30 (D. C. App., 1936).
2. Hartnett v. Tripp, 231 Mass. 382, 121 N. E. 17 (1918); Smith v.
Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 79 Wash. 448, 140 Pac. 685 (1914) ; Hoseth v. Pres-
ton Mill Co., 49 Wash. 682, 96 Pac. 423 (1908) ; Papic v. Freund, 181 S. W.
1161 (Mo. App., 1916); Wagner v. Mettendorf, 232 N. Y. 481, 134 N. E.
539 (1922); Brown v. Beck, 63 Cal. App. 686, 220 Pac. 14 (1923).
3. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Kenney, at p. 30.
4. Hartnett v. Tripp, supra, note 2.
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